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I. Introduction
One of the most prominent recent technological trends has been the rise 
of personal activity monitors (“fitness trackers”)—devices that allow users 
to track, monitor, and share the minute details of their physical lives.  
Companies like Fitbit, Jawbone, Apple, Nike, and Garmin offer devices 
that track a user’s heart rate, number of steps taken, activity levels, sleep 
quality and duration, and calories burned.
1
  The various types of sensitive 
information collected by these devices can be categorized as “personal 
fitness information” (“PFI”).  Additionally, these devices are capable of 
wirelessly syncing sensitive health information they collect to users’ 
computers, smartphones, and social media accounts.
2
 
In the landmark case of Katz v. United States,
3
 the Supreme Court 
established that individuals are entitled to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
4
  But what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
individuals voluntarily share their private information?  The popularity of 
fitness trackers raises crucial privacy concerns such as how much control 
users of fitness trackers actually exercise over the use of their PFI and 
whether that control is meaningful. 
This note will address the unique and heightened privacy concerns 
presented by fitness trackers and address the gaps in current privacy laws, 
which fail to provide adequate consumer protections or regulation of these 
devices.  Part II of this note will detail the rise in popularity of fitness 
trackers, the development of privacy rights through case law, and the key 
1. See Brent Rose, The Best Fitness Tracker for Every Need, GIZMODO (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://gizmodo.com/the-best-fitness-tracker-for-every-exercise-1673000514. 
2. Julia M. Siripurapu, On the Twelfth Day of Privacy, My True Love Gave to Me . . . 12
Different Types of Wearables!, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/twelfth-day-privacy-my-true-love-gave-to-me-12-different-types-wearables.  
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that “a person has a constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
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features of the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996
5
 (“HIPAA”) in order to provide relevant context to the privacy 
concerns raised by these devices.  Part III will break down the privacy 
concerns raised by fitness trackers into three separate, but related, 
categories: (1) The Dangers of the Quantified Self; (2) The Dangers of 
Using Fitness Trackers in the Employment Context; and (3) The Dangers 
Associated with Big Data.  Each of these categories presents unique 
privacy concerns and, together, they demonstrate the urgent need for 
regulating fitness trackers.  Accordingly, Part IV proposes a statutory 
solution modeled after HIPAA, but crafted to explicitly protect the 
sensitive information gathered and stored by fitness tracking devices.  Even 
though HIPAA, as amended by the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”), protects against the 
improper disclosure of private health information,
6
 this note contends that 
the statute does not provide adequate protection to users of fitness trackers 
because it generally does not apply to those devices.  While HIPAA does 
not typically apply to fitness trackers or PFI, HIPAA is an appropriate 
statutory model because it outlines a comprehensive approach to protecting 
sensitive information. 
II. Background
A. The Rise of Fitness Trackers
It is no secret that the rise of connected or “smart” devices has been
meteoric.
7
  According to one study, more than 30 billion devices could be 
wirelessly connected to the Internet by the year 2020.
8
  Fitness trackers, a 
subset of the Internet of Things, are wearable devices that allow users to 
track, record, and share every step taken, calorie burned, and hour slept, via 
the Internet.
9
  A study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers indicated that one in 
five American adults owns a wearable device,
10
 and the research firm 
Canalys reported that eight million activity-tracking bands were expected 
to ship in 2014.
11
  Canalys also estimated that the number of fitness 
5. Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (104th Cong. 2d Sess., 1996)
6. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
7. Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United
States v. Jones to Protect People’s Data., 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 392 (2015). 
8. Id.
9. See Siripurapu, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. James A. Martin, Pros and Cons of Using Fitness Trackers for Employee Wellness, CIO
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.cio.com/article/2377723/it-strategy/pros-and-cons-of-using-fitness-
trackers-for-employee-wellness.html. 
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trackers expected to ship will rise to 23 million units by 2015 and to more 
than 45 million by 2017.
12
  In fact, seven million fitness bands were sold in 
Q1 of 2015 alone.
13
  While it is difficult to predict the exact number of 
fitness trackers that will be sold in the next few years,
14
 it is clear from this 
data that fitness tracker sales are rapidly increasing. 
As fitness trackers grow in popularity, more companies have 
introduced their own models.
15
  For instance, a December 2014 article 
published by Gizmodo listed nearly 25 different brands that offer, or will 
soon offer, fitness-tracking devices with features ranging from step 
counting to sleep tracking and others.
16
  For example, Fitbit currently offers 
six different models of fitness trackers: “Zip,” “One,” “Flex,” “Surge,” 
“Charge,” and “Charge HR,” which offer a range of features,
17
 including 
steps taken, distance traveled, calories burned, floors climbed, hours slept, 
alarm functions, heart rate monitoring, GPS tracking, wireless syncing, text 
notifications, caller ID, music controls, and both online and mobile tools.
18
  
Similarly, Jawbone currently offers four different models of fitness trackers 
that include features
19
 such as steps and distance tracking, calories burned, 
food and drink logging, “Smart Coach,”
20
 sleep tracking, goal setting, 
“Smart Alarm,” “Idle Alert,” heart health monitoring, auto activity 
classification,
21
 water resistance, wireless syncing, a compatible mobile 
12. Id.
13. Sophie Charara, If You Own a Fitness Tracker, Chances Are It’s a Fitbit, WAREABLE
(May 22, 2015), http://www.wareable.com/fitbit/fitness-tracker-sales-2015-fitbit-1169. 
14. Compare estimates presented in Martin, supra note 11, to estimates reported in Deborah 
Lupton, Self-tracking Modes: Reflexive Self-Monitoring and Data Practices, NEWS & MEDIA 
RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CANBERRA (2014), and Zsarlene B. Chua, Privacy Risks Threaten 
Future of Wearables, BUSINESSWORLD (December 23, 2014), http://www.bworldonline.com/ 
content.php?section=Technology&title=privacy-risks-threaten-future-of-wearables&id=100041. 
15. See Rose, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Some models do not offer all of the features listed.  For example, more basic models
such as the “Flex” do not include a continuous heart rate monitor, sleep tracking & alarm 
function, GPS tracking, or floors climbed.  See Find Your Fit, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/ 
compare (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
18. Id.
19. Some models do not offer all of the features listed.  For example, the “UPmove” model
does not include the “Smart Alarm,” “Idle Alert,” heart health monitoring, or auto activity 
classification features.  See Compare Trackers, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up/trackers (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2015).  
20. Id.
21. See id. (stating that this feature, available on all three models, learns habits and 
recognizes an individual user’s activities over time “by using data from the built-in accelerometer 
and sensors to identify patterns in your movement and automatically associates them with 
activities”).  
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app, and even the ability to make American Express payments.
22
  These are 
just the features offered by two of the big names behind fitness trackers.  
This wide range of features demonstrates that consumers are purchasing 
these devices and using them to track every detail of their physical lives.  
These devices are, therefore, capable of painting nuanced portraits of their 
users’ health, activity levels, and overall wellness in an unprecedented level 
of detail. 
While these features offer a variety of health benefits,
23
 they also raise 
privacy concerns.  Jawbone’s auto activity classification and Smart Coach 
features raise particularly high privacy risks because they use data gathered 
by the device to identify patterns and make conclusions about a user’s 
activities.
24
  The ability of these devices to not only record but also analyze 
and assess fitness information raises important privacy concerns regarding 
how this fitness information is transmitted and protected, particularly when 
companies can share this information with third parties or use it for their 
own benefit, and even when such information can be used as evidence in a 
court of law.
25
  These are just a few of the privacy concerns raised when 
individuals voluntarily record and transmit their every move with the help 
of personal fitness trackers. 
B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first articulated the legal
right to privacy.
26
  Nearly eighty years later, Justice Harlan set forth the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard in Katz.
27
  There, the Court 
recognized that the Constitution protects what a person seeks to preserve as 
private, even in a publically accessible area.
28
  In Katz, the pressing privacy 
concern was third party surveillance or intrusion upon an individual’s 
22. See id. (“Smart Coach was designed with human nature in mind. It takes all the inputs it
receives from your UP® tracker and analyzes that information to give you the personalized 
advice and insights you need to reach your fitness, sleep and overall health goals.”). 
23. See e.g., The Up® System, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up (last visited Feb. 8, 2015)
(inviting users to “[i]mprove the quality of your days and nights through a deeper understanding 
of how your diet, sleep, activity and the choices you make affect your health and well-being”). 
24. See Compare Trackers, JAWBONE, supra note 19.
25. See George Waggott & Wilson McCutchan, Fitbit Evidence: Coming Soon to a Court
Near You, MONDAQ (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/355492/employment 
+litigation+tribunals/Fitbit+Evidence+Coming+Soon+To+A+Court+Near+You (reporting that a
Canadian litigator will rely on Fitbit tracking information as evidence that his client suffered 
debilitating personal injuries).
26. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(Dec. 1890) (recognizing the “right to be let alone”). 
27. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“. . . [A] person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
28. Id. at 351.
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privacy, typically when the individual is unaware that they are being 
recorded.
29
  While the “reasonable expectation” standard of privacy may 
have been appropriate in the late 1960s, it is unclear how that standard 
translates into the modern technological realities of fitness trackers, 
Facebook, and Twitter when individuals routinely record and share the 
details of their daily lives.  Today, the concerns around privacy have 
shifted dramatically because contemporary surveillance is no longer just 
third party surveillance, but also “self-surveillance.”
30
  Scholars have 
described the phenomenon of self-surveillance as “[u]sing various existing 
and emerging technologies, such as GPS-enabled smartphones, we are 
beginning to measure ourselves in granular detail—how long we sleep, 
where we go, what we breathe, what we eat, how we spend our time.”
31
 
Thus, the fundamental difference between the surveillance 
contemplated in Katz and self-surveillance is that, for self-surveillance, 
“the threat may actually come from ourselves.”
32
  According to one 
scholar, “[n]early everything people do today becomes data. And nearly 
every bit of data is shared, knowingly or unknowingly, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, with others.”
33
  Moreover, much of this data is collected, as 
in the case of fitness trackers, because individuals are voluntarily and 
intentionally participating in self-surveillance.  What limits can the 
reasonable expectancy of privacy standard provide when individuals are 
intentionally recording their thoughts, activities, and behaviors and sharing 
them with the world?
34
  In other words, how does the reasonable 
expectation of privacy function when consumers voluntarily share their 
fitness information to a select group of people or even publicly? 
Although the Third Party doctrine has established that anything a 
person knowingly exposes to the public is in the public sphere and, 
therefore, not subject to the Fourth Amendment, that doctrine has been 
called into question.
35
  Notably, in United States v. Jones, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence challenged the Third Party doctrine, calling it “ill 
29. Id.; See also Jerry Kang, Katie Shilton, Deborah Estrin, Jeff Burke, and Mark Hansen,
Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 825 (2012) (“In the standard privacy problem, 
personal data are collected by some counterparty in the course of an individual’s interaction with 
that counterparty.”).  
30. Kang et al., supra note 29, at 814.
31. Id. at 812.
32. Id.
33. See Turner, supra note 7, at 381.
34. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the reasonable expectation of privacy has changed in the digital age, in which 
people regularly reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties).  
35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 3401–
3422, as recognized in Dadidov v. SEC, 415 F. Supp. 2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y 2006).  
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suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”
36
  She stated that she “would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed . . . for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”
37
  This note contends, as 
Justice Sotomayor suggests, that users do not forfeit their reasonable 
expectation of privacy simply because they have shared fitness information 
with companies like Fitbit and Jawbone for limited health-related purposes. 
While user expectations may be somewhat limited, they can still reasonably 
expect that their information will only be used as outlined in company 
privacy policies
38
 for specific purposes and should still retain control over 
how their information is shared with third parties.  For example, if a 
company shares user information in violation of its own privacy policy, the 
Federal Trade Commission can impose fines under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTCA”).
39
  Thus, the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard still applies in the digital age and is strengthened by statutes like 
the FTCA and HIPAA, which protect against the improper uses of personal 
information. 
C. The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HIPAA was enacted in 1996 and amended by the HITECH (“the Act”)
in 2009.
40
  The Act protects against the improper disclosure of individually 
identifiable health information held by covered entities and their business 
associates.
41
  The purpose behind the Act is to balance protecting 
individuals’ health information with permitting the disclosure of health 
information necessary for effective patient care.
42
  HIPAA achieves this 
purpose by establishing the first set of national standards for protecting 
health information.
43
  However, HIPAA is limited because it does not apply 
to all health information or all companies that handle health information.
44
  
36. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. See infra Section III.
39. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 134
(2013). 
40. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 6. 
41. Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
42. Id.
43. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 6. 
44. See id.
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HIPAA only covers Protected Health Information (“PHI”),
45
 which is 
defined as “individually identifiable health information.”
46
  In addition, 
HIPAA only applies to covered entities—health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and any health care provider who transmits health 
information in electronic form—and their business associates.
47
 
Although HIPAA does not cover fitness trackers or PFI, its 
comprehensive approach to protecting sensitive information serves as a 
strong model for protecting PFI.  HIPAA provides substantial protections 
by requiring Notice, Right of Access, and Authorization.
48
  While the 
Notice requirement establishes that covered entities must give notice 
regarding their privacy practices, the Right of Access requirement grants 
patients the right to access any PHI used to make decisions about them.
49
  
Additionally, the Authorization requirement establishes that patient 
authorization is required for all uses and disclosures of health information, 
except for treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.
50
  HIPAA also 




HIPAA consists of three primary parts: (1) The Standards for Privacy 
of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“The Privacy Rule”),
52
 (2) 
The Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health 
Information (“The Security Rule”),
53
 and (3) The HITECH Act.
54
  The 
Privacy Rule aims to limit the circumstances in which PHI may be used or 
disclosed.
55
  It provides that “[a] covered entity must make reasonable 
efforts to use, disclose, and request only the minimum amount of protected 





46. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 134.
47. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 6. 




52. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 6. 
53. Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/srsummary.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
54. HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2014). 
55. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 6. 
56. Id.
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Unlike the Privacy Rule, the Security Rule only applies to electronic 
protected health information (“e-PHI”), a subset of PHI that includes “all 
individually identifiable health information a covered entity creates, 
receives, maintains or transmits in electronic form.”
57
  The Security Rule 
establishes standards for protecting e-PHI by requiring technical and non-
technical safeguards.
58
  These safeguards include training and hiring 
security personnel, workforce training, ensuring facility access and control, 
workspace and device security, controlling access, and ensuring protected 
information is not improperly altered or deleted.
59
  While the Security Rule 
takes a flexible, case-by-case approach to protecting e-PHI, it establishes 
four basic requirements of covered entities: (1) ensuring the confidentiality 
and integrity of e-PHI they create or transmit; (2) identifying and protecting 
against threats to security; (3) protecting against reasonably anticipated 




The HITECH Act, enacted in February 2009,
61
 establishes notification 
requirements for data security breaches of covered entities that involve 
PHI.
62
  The Act defines a breach as “an unauthorized disclosure of 
unencrypted PHI.”
63
  Additionally, it establishes that notification must be 
given “without reasonable delay,”
64
 requires that breaches that affect more 
than 500 individuals must be reported to the media,
65
 and extends HIPAA 
to cover business associates.
66
  Together, these three components of 
HIPAA provide the foundation for a comprehensive approach to protecting 
PHI held by covered entities and business associates. 
Adopting a similar approach to data collected by fitness trackers would 
provide comprehensive protection of PFI.  Protections like the Security 
Rule and the data breach notification requirements of the HITECH Act are 
especially important in the context of fitness trackers because PFI is almost 
exclusively electronic information, which presents particularly high 
security and data breach risks. 
57. HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 




61. Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 53.. 
62. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 39, at 99, 107.
63. Id. at 107
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 103.
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HIPAA does not provide a private right of action.
67
  Instead, the 
Department of Justice is responsible for criminal enforcement, while the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is responsible for civil 
enforcement through its Office of Civil Rights.
68
  However, scholars such 
as Daniel Solove and Peter Winn have pointed out that plaintiffs have been 
able to use HIPAA to establish standard of care when bringing common 
law actions under state law.
69
  Solove explains, “[f]or breach of 
confidentiality, courts look to norms, ethical rules, and laws to determine 
the duties that caregivers owe to patients.  HIPAA is a law that establishes 
duties, and thus serves as a useful source of duties for the common law.”
70
  
For example, as Solove observes,
71
 both the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology
72
 and the West 
Virginia Supreme Court
73
 held that HIPAA may be used to establish the 
standard of care in negligence claims.  Winn also argues, “the HIPAA 
Privacy Rules are likely to be adopted in private state actions for breach of 
confidentiality as establishing the duty.”
74
  Thus, HIPAA not only 
establishes a comprehensive approach to protecting sensitive health 
information enforced by federal agencies, but also aids plaintiffs seeking to 
bring common law claims for invasions of privacy.  Applying Solove and 
Winn’s work to the fitness tracker context, the HIPAA model demonstrates 
that a private right of action may not be necessary in order to effectively 
protect PFI. 
III. The Heightened Privacy Concerns Presented By Using
Fitness Trackers to Record and Transmit Personal Fitness
Information 
A. The Dangers of the Quantified Self
The natural product of self-surveillance is the “Quantified Self.”  The
Quantified Self Movement takes advantage of technology in order to 
67. Id. at 99.
68. Id. at 106.
69. See Daniel Solove, Lawsuits for HIPAA Violations and Beyond: A Journey Down the
Rabbit Hole, LINKEDIN PULSE (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141118051323 
-2259773-lawsuits-for-hipaa-violations-and-beyond-a-journey-down-the-rabbit-hole?trk=mp-read
er-card; Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 619–20 (2002).
70. Solove, supra note 69; Winn, supra note 69, at 619–20.
71. Solove, supra note 69.
72. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics and Gynecology, No. 18904, 2014 WL 5507439
(Conn. Nov. 11, 2014) 
73. R.K. v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 735 S.E.2d 715 (W.Va. 2012).
74. Winn, supra note 69, at 19–20.
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encourage self-awareness by tracking data relating to an individual’s 
exercise, diet, sleep habits, health maintenance, financial management, 
learning, and general wellness.
75
  Although fitness trackers may provide 
significant benefits in terms of health and wellness, the level of detail that 
these devices can convey about their wearers’ private lives raises unique 
and heightened privacy concerns.
76
  Wearable devices like fitness trackers 
present especially high privacy risks “because of the kinds and volume of 
data they collect.  This includes, but isn’t limited to, email addresses, 
logins, passwords and other credentials; steps; heart-rate information; 
physical addresses, routes travelled and other location data; sleep habits, 
and height and weight details.”
77
  In the words of Kevin Haley, the Director 
of Symantec’s Security Response Team, “[i]t’s the nature of the data that’s 
being collected . . . .  This is really getting to the essence of our being.  It’s 




Arguably, a greater cause for concern is not simply the volume and 
type of data being collected, but what the data is used for and where it is 
sent.  For example, a recent test of twelve fitness apps performed by the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) found that those apps transmitted 
personal information and other data to 76 different entities.
79
  What is more 
alarming is that an FTC Commissioner admitted, “[w]e don’t know where 
that information ultimately goes.”
80
 
When it comes to the Quantified Self, it is difficult to imagine that 
consumers can make meaningful or informed decisions about privacy and 
the collection of massive amounts of sensitive health information when 
they are unaware of who receives that information or the reason it is being 
collected.  As Haley points out, “[i]n five years, we’ll discover it’s being 
used in ways we couldn’t have guessed.  In the short term, people may not 
care if people know how much they weigh, but . . . we may not ultimately 
want people to have that information.”
81
 
75. Turner, supra note 7, at 388 (citing Joseph Bradley, When IoE Gets Personal: The
Quantified Self Movement!, CISCO BLOG (Sept. 10, 2013), http://blogs.cisco.com/zzfeatured/ 
when-ioe-gets-personal-the-quantified-self-movement/). 
76. See Al Sacco, Fitness Trackers Are Changing Online Privacy—and It’s Time to Pay




79. Editorial, Smart Watches and Weak Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/opinion/smartwatches-and-weak-privacy-rules.html?_r=0. 
80. Id.
81. See Sacco, supra note 76.
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Another concern, which is often overlooked, is the different levels of 
sharing.  A user may be comfortable sharing her PFI with a select group, 
for example, all of her friends or her workout group.  However, simply 
because that user has chosen to share her PFI with a particular group does 
not mean that she has given permission for her information to be shared 
with advertisers or the general public.  Additionally, the fact that a user has 
shared PFI for one purpose, such as assisting in reaching fitness goals, does 
not mean she should be required to share that information for other 
purposes like advertising.  The fact that users have chosen to share certain 
information does not necessarily indicate they have completely forfeited 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.  In fact, the 
choices individuals make about who to share their PFI with, when to share, 
and what that information may be used for, strongly suggest that users 
expect their fitness information to only be shared in particular ways and for 
particular purposes dictated by the users’ choices. 
B. Fitbit in the Office: Incentivized Sharing of Fitness Information in the
Employment Context
Fitness trackers raise particularly high concerns because they present
new types of privacy problems.  Unlike the traditional privacy concerns of 
third-party surveillance,
82
 users of fitness trackers voluntarily record and 
transmit their lives in granular detail.  Thus, the most pressing issue is not 
whether users are being recorded, but what happens to the sensitive 
information collected by fitness trackers after users have intentionally and 
voluntarily shared it. 
Concerns over how PFI is used are particularly poignant when fitness 
trackers are used in the employment context.  Many employers are 
beginning to incorporate fitness trackers into wellness programs as a tool 
for improving their employees’ health.
83
  The research firm Gartner 
estimates that 10,000 companies offered fitness trackers to their staff in 
2014.
84
  Fitbit, for example, has begun selling its devices to employers 
82. Kang et al., supra note 29, at 825 (“In the standard privacy problem, personal data are 
collected by some counterparty in the course of an individual’s interaction with that 
counterparty.”).  
83. See Lisa Evans, Is the Quantified Employee a Healthier Employee?, FAST CO. (Sept.
2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/3036364/wearables-week/is-the-quantified-employee-a-
healthier-employee (“According to ABI Research, more than 13 million wearable fitness tracking 
devices are expected to be incorporated into employee wellness programs within the next five
years.”); see also Martin, supra note 7 (“By 2018, more than 13 million wearable activity-
tracking devices will be integrated into employee wellness programs, based on estimates from 
ABI research.”).
84. Stuart Dredge, Why the Workplace of 2016 Could Echo Orwell’s 1984, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/23/data-and-tracking-
devices-in-the-workplace-amazon. 
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who, with their employees’ permission, “can then track their workers’ 
health, see how active individual employees are, and foster a little healthy 
competition.”
85
  Both employers and employees seem to benefit from this 
exchange,
86
 but the trend also seems to be incentive-based: employees 
agree to wear fitness trackers and, in exchange, receive benefits from their 
employers.
87
  For instance, Shannon Daly, Vice President of Human 
Resources at the cloud-consultancy firm Apriro, suggests that companies 
“[o]ffer the fitness trackers as an incentive and give them away where 
possible . . . .  Provide challenges that motivate employees to participate in 
your company wellness program using the tracker.  Be transparent and 
explain how the employee metadata results may be used.”
88
 
Another example of this incentive-based approach is Bates College, 
which recently offered Fitbit “Zip” devices to employees in order to 
encourage participation in its employee wellness competition (called 
“Ready, Set, Go”).
89
  Thirty-five percent of the college’s 700 employees 
currently participate in the program.
90
  According to the program’s director, 
Mike Milliken, “[w]hen we issued them initially, we were upfront about the 
fact it wasn’t simply a gift for signing up. . . .  They needed to earn it by 
using it, and that seems to be driving engagement.”
91
  Even though 
employees voluntarily participate in these programs, using fitness trackers 
in employee wellness programs still raises significant privacy concerns as 
to whether employers are using the information gathered by such devices 
appropriately.
92
  In fact, journalist Jack Smith has anticipated the dangers 
that will likely arise when employers receive their employees’ private 
health information: “. . . once premiums and plans are directly tied to 
employees’ day to day health, it’s pretty easy to imagine a world where 
company culture, or even hiring decisions, are driven by individual 
85. Jack Smith IV, Fitbit Is Now Officially Profiting From Users’ Health Data, OBSERVER
(Apr. 18, 2014), http://observer.com/2014/04/fitbit-is-now-officially-profiting-from-users-health-
data/#ixzz2zdt0LO2w; see also Martin, supra note 11 (“Fitness trackers, mobile apps and Web-
based dashboards let workers count calories and steps, monitor sleep patterns, compete against 
colleagues and earn prizes.”). 
86. See Evans, supra note 83.




91. Id. (quoting Mike Milliken) (emphasis added).
92. See John F. Wasik, Employers’ Health Care Push: Play by Our Rules, or Pay, THE 
FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/03/06/Empl 
oyers-Make-Health-Care-Push-Play-Our-Rules-or-Pay#sthash.IAjxaAi8.dpuf (“[E]mployers are 
increasingly calling the shots on how employees receive their benefits—and workers may be 
penalized or rewarded depending upon how they take care of themselves. That means they may 
be subject to regular monitoring and told to enroll in health care management programs.”).  
   
104 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:1 
fitness.”
93
  For example, suppose two employees are up for the same 
promotion, and Employee A volunteers to wear a fitness tracker provided 
by the employer, but Employee B does not.  Could the employer assume 
Employee B is less of a team player than Employee A and hold that 
assumption against him? 
This example demonstrates another danger: whether an employee’s 
choice to participate in a fitness-tracker-based wellness program will 
remain truly voluntary.  In his article, “Unraveling Privacy: The Personal 
Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future,” Scott Peppet argues 
that companies are able to extract private information that they ordinarily 
could not obtain by offering economic incentives to consumers who share 
that information.
94
  The real danger, however, occurs when such incentive-
based exchanges of sensitive, personal information become the norm: 
“[a]lthough at first consumers may receive a discount for using a driving or 
health monitor, privacy may unravel as those who refuse to disclose are 
assumed to be withholding negative information and therefore stigmatized 
and penalized.”
95
  It is easy to imagine how this concern could translate 
into a workplace environment.  Once a critical mass of employees begins 
voluntarily exchanging private health information for incentives through 
fitness trackers, it is probable that employers will assume that those who 
refuse to do so have something to hide.  While it is easy to imagine the 
negative consequences that might result from such assumptions—denial of 
opportunities, promotions, etc.—those who are affected are unlikely to 
receive redress for these injuries because instances of negative 
discrimination are difficult to prove.  Because of the danger that PFI will be 
used for discriminatory purposes, fitness tracker regulation is necessary to 
prevent the use of PFI for discriminatory or other improper purposes. 
C. Big Data Is Always Watching: The Dangers of Big Data and Fitness
Trackers
Fitness trackers have the potential to cause especially egregious
invasions of privacy when the health information gathered by such devices 
ends up in the hands of Big Data.  Big Data can be defined as a “problem-
solving philosophy that leverages massive datasets and algorithmic analysis 
to extract ‘hidden information and surprising correlations.’”
96
  Unlike the 
surveillance at issue in Katz, which was collected for a specific purpose and 
93. Smith, supra note 85.
94. Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2011). 
95. Id. at 1156.
96. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 81 (Sept. 2013). 
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likely kept for a limited period of time,
97
 the data collected by fitness 
trackers can be retained indefinitely on a company’s servers.  This section 
will demonstrate that the combination of fitness trackers and Big Data is 
particularly threatening to privacy rights for three primary reasons:  (1) 
there is a lack of awareness about the use of information by Big Data that 
prevents users from making informed decisions about sharing their private 
information; (2) even if consumers do understand the impact of Big Data, 
data gathered today will likely have unexpected future uses; and (3) the line 
between de-identified and identifying data is becoming increasingly blurry 
because it is becoming easier to identify users through information that 
both users and companies treat as anonymous.  While each of these issues 
presents privacy concerns on its own, together these three problems 
seriously undermine the ability of current protections to adequately secure 
individual privacy rights by breaking down privacy protections from three 
different, but related, directions. 
1. Consumers’ Lack of Perception About the Predictive Power of Big Data
Compromises Their Ability to Make Informed Decisions About Their Fitness
Information
One of the most basic dangers presented by fitness trackers is the lack
of consumer awareness about how PFI can be used when it is collected in 
the aggregate.  Turner provides the example of the two-way mirror to 
illustrate this problem: “the end-user sees her own activities reflected in the 
two-way mirror, and does not realize that on the other side, she is actually 
being observed by any number of faceless, non-descript organizations that 
she probably does not even know exist.”
98
  Because consumers are not fully 
cognizant of how their information will be used once it is collected by 
fitness trackers, it is difficult for users to make informed choices about 
how, when, or even if they should record and share the nuances of their 
daily lives.  In fact, many of the privacy protections currently relied upon, 
such as Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and “Opt-In” policies, require 
consumers to be informed in order to be effective.  Put simply, consent is 
less probative when users do not fully understand what they are consenting 
to.  Without effective understanding of how data will be used when 




In a recent paper, researchers from Clemson University conducted 
qualitative content analysis of online comments related to users’ privacy 
97. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. See Turner, supra note 7, at 383.
99. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 25 (2013). 
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concerns about wearable devices.
100
  They found that users perceived 
devices worn on the wrist, including fitness trackers, as presenting fewer 
privacy concerns than other devices.
101
  The researchers suggest that users 
likely do not understand how this data can be misused by third parties, the 
privacy implications that arise when data is retained for long periods of 
time, or how this data can be combined with complementary data.
102
  For 
instance, despite finding that users do not perceive devices like fitness 
trackers as threatening, the authors’ analysis suggests that GPS sensors 
present the most critical privacy concerns for users of wearable devices.
103
  
Thus, this research suggests that users have a false sense of security when it 
comes to fitness trackers—they mistakenly view these devices as having 
fewer privacy concerns even though activity trackers involve critical 
privacy concerns like tracking and recording user locations. 
This lack of awareness seems to stem from users’ perception of fitness 
trackers as harmless, innocuous devices.  Australian privacy advocate and 
researcher Katina Michael has addressed consumers’ misconceptions about 
fitness trackers by going so as far as to compare fitness trackers to “state 
surveillance anklets.”
104
  She declared, “[w]e’re being duped into thinking 
they’re liberating devices, when they’re devices of enslavement. . . .  And 
consumers aren’t saying ‘uh-oh, there’s a problem here’.  They’re saying 
‘bring it on!’”
105
  While Michael’s comments may seem harsh, her point is 
critical: consumers often underestimate and place too much trust in their 
fitness trackers. 
One explanation for users’ false sense of security regarding fitness 
trackers is the fact that these devices are often worn like fashion 
accessories or jewelry
106
 and, consequently, blend seamlessly into users’ 
daily lives.  For example, Leaf, a new fitness tracker set to hit the market in 
May 2015, is designed to be worn as a necklace and is even marketed as 
100. Vivian Genaro Motti & Kelly Caine, Users’ Privacy Concerns About Wearables:
Impact of Form Factor, Sensors and Type of Data Collected 1 CLEMSON UNIV., 
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/wearable/paper_2.pdf.  
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 4.1. 
104. Richard Chirgwin, Welcome to ‘Uber-veillance’ Says Australian Privacy Foundation, 
THE REGISTER (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/13/its_already_too_late_ 
for_privacy/.  
105. Id.
106. See Molly Wood, Jawbone Up3 Band Takes Tracking to the Extreme, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/jawbone-up3-band-takes-tracking-to-the-extr 
eme/?ref=technology&_r=0. (describing how Jawbone’s fitness tracking devices increasingly 
look like jewelry and reporting that Jawbone encourages its partners to design versions that look 
even more like bracelets than activity monitors).  
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“the world’s smartest piece of jewelry.”
107
  Apple and Fitbit both offer 
interchangeable bands designed by luxury brands such as Hermès and Tory 
Burch,
108
 and the newly released Apple Watch is advertised as not only a 
powerful, multifaceted smart device, but also a “true expression of your 
personal taste.”
109
  Because fitness trackers are deigned to blend into users’ 
lifestyles, users are unlikely to seriously consider the privacy implications 
raised by such devices and are more likely to view them as innocuous 
everyday objects.  This misperception of fitness trackers poses serious 
threats to protecting user privacy.  While users may understand the privacy 
risks associated with wearing fitness trackers, they are less likely to view 
these concerns seriously if they think of their fitness tracker as a stylish, 
harmless accessory.  The tendency to underestimate these privacy concerns 
will, therefore, undermine privacy protections such as requiring Privacy 
Policies, agreeing to Terms of Service, and “Opt-In” approaches by 
diminishing the level of care users exercise when deciding whether to opt 
in or agree to a company’s policies.
110
 
2. Because Data Gathered Today Will Likely Be Used for Unforeseen Purposes,
It Is Unlikely that Current Privacy Protections Will Be Able to Adequately
Guard Against Future Uses of Data
Even assuming that users do fully appreciate the privacy concerns
surrounding the current uses of data gathered by fitness trackers, sensitive 
information gathered and shared by connected devices is often used for 
unforeseen purposes.  While users may make informed decisions about 
casually sharing personal information in one context, it is becoming much 
easier for seemingly innocuous data to be used to elicit unexpectedly 
revealing information.
111
  For example, a recent study suggests that a 
computer model can predict individual personality traits such as how much 
someone drinks, whether they do drugs, and what subject they are likely to 
107. See BELLABEAT, https://www.bellabeat.com (last visited May 5, 2015) (describing the 
Leaf fitness tracker with the tagline “technology meets fashion”). 
108. See Hermès, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/apple-watch-hermes/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2015); see also Tory Burch for Fitbit, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/toryburch (last visited Sept. 
15, 2015).  
109. Apple Watch, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/watch/?cid=wwa-us-kwg-watch-com (last
visited May 5, 2015). 
110. See e.g., Emma Hutchings, Fitbit Users’ Sexual Activity Found In Google Search
Results, PSFK (July 4, 2011), http://www.psfk.com/2011/07/fitbit-users-sexual-activity-found-in-
google-search-results.html (reporting that users who were not careful with their privacy settings 
inadvertently allowed their sexual activity data, collected and shared by FitBit, to appear in 
Google search results).  
111. See Anna North, How Your Facebook Likes Could Cost You a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2015), http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/how-your-facebook-likes-could-cost-you-
a-job/?_r=1. 
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study, based solely on that person’s Facebook likes.
112
  Other researchers 
assert that Facebook likes can reveal attributes, including gender, sexual 
orientation, race, intelligence, and political leanings.
113
  While Facebook 
likes, like fitness trackers, are seemingly harmless, these studies 
demonstrate that the door is open for automated psychological assessment 
and other inferences based on an individual’s digital footprint and 
performed without permission or notice.
114
  Similarly, in a recent FTC Staff 
Report, one researcher hypothesized that “although a consumer may today 
use a fitness tracker solely for wellness-related purposes, the data gathered 
by the device could be used in the future to price health or life insurance or 
to infer the user’s suitability for credit or employment.”
115
  For instance, 
researchers at the University of Illinois have developed an app for smart 
watches that can track the keystrokes made by someone wearing the 
device.
116
  While the app is still in its early stages and has not yet been 
perfected, the researchers anticipate that this technology could result in 
“motion leaks” and could potentially reveal personal information like 
passwords and login credentials.
117
  As one user attempts to use Fitbit as 
evidence in a Canadian personal injury case,
118
 this raises further questions 
about how the health information gathered by fitness trackers could have 
112. Id.
113. See Adi Kamdar & Dave Maass, You Won’t Like What Your Facebook ‘Likes’ Reveal, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/facebook-likes-
reveal-sensitive-personal-information (reporting that researchers, based on Facebook likes, were 
able to predict whether a user was African American or white 95% of the time, male or female 
93% of the time, sexual orientation 88% of the time for men and 75% of the time for women, 
political leaning (Republican versus Democrat) 85% of the time, and whether your parents 
divorced when you were a kid 60% of the time, make reasonably accurate guesses about whether 
you were a drug user, drinker, or smoker, as well as a host of other attributes, including emotional 
stability, satisfaction with life, and extraversion). 
114. See id. (stating that information individuals share for one purpose can now easily be
collated and acted upon “for wildly different purposes”); see also North, supra note 111. 
115. FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC
STAFF REPORT (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt. 
pdf.  
116. Victoria Woollaston, Smartwatch Hack Lets Criminals Know What You’re TYPING:




118. See Kate Crawford, When Fitbit Data Is the Expert Witness, THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/when-fitbit-is-the-expert-
witness/382936/. 
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unanticipated significance in future legal cases, employment decisions, 
disability claims, or insurance benefits.
119
 
The concerns surrounding unanticipated uses of PFI are both distinct 
from and related to the underestimation of the privacy risks associated with 
these devices.  While both issues deal with users’ difficulty or resistance to 
grasping the privacy risks that currently exist, the unforeseen future uses of 
private information raise particularly high privacy concerns because this 
problem might not be solved by simply providing notice or educating 
consumers about the risks of sharing data.  Even someone who makes 
careful and considered decisions about sharing information cannot be 
certain that their data will not be used for some unanticipated and 
detrimental purpose in the future. 
3. As It Becomes Easier to Re-identify Users Through “Anonymized” Data,  the
Line Between Identifying and Non-identifying Data Is Beginning to Disappear
The ability of users to effectively control how their own fitness data is
used and shared is further complicated by the blurring line between 
identifying and non-identifying data.
120
  Most companies that offer fitness 
tracking devices draw a distinction between sharing non-identifying and 
identifying data with third parties.
121
  Fitbit’s privacy policy, for example, 
permits the company to share and sell aggregated, de-identified data for 
research or reports about health and fitness.
122
  For example, shortly after 
119. See id. (“The current lawsuit is an example of Fitbit data being used to support a
plaintiff in an injury case, but wearables data could just as easily be used by insurers to deny 
disability claims, or by prosecutors seeking a rich source of self-incriminating evidence.”).  
120. See Giulio Coraggio, What is Anonymous Data?, GAMING TECH L.BLOG (May 12,
2014), http://www.gamingtechlaw.com/2014/05/what-is-anonymous-data.html (“Problems
relating to what data/images/information can be consider [sic] anonymous is one of the major
data protection issues of privacy law having an impact in any sector including the Internet of
Things, eHealth and on any activity that tries to rely on Big Data or in general large databases.”).
121. See e.g., Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/privacy (last visited Feb.
10, 2015) (“First and foremost: We don’t sell any data that could identify you. We only share data 
about you when it is necessary to provide the Fitbit Service, when the data is de-identified 
and aggregated, or when you direct us to share it.”); Website Privacy, JAWBONE, 
https://jawbone.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“We do not rent, sell or otherwise share 
your individual, personal information with third parties . . .  We share aggregated usage statistics 
that cannot be used to identify you individually.”); Basis Privacy Policy, BASIS, 
https://www.mybasis.com/legal/privacy/ (last visited Feb 10, 2015) (“We may share or sell 
aggregated, de-identified data with third parties, including, but not limited to, for marketing 
purposes or with research organizations”); Privacy Policy, WITHINGS, http://www-medi 
a-cdn.withings.com/wysiwyg/legal/2015-Privacy-policy-VUS.pdf?_ga=1.84430169.1929328589.
1423651096 (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“We undertake not to sell your personal data without
your prior agreement. At Withings, we firmly believe that data can serve the collective interest.
We may produce statistics and analyses using collected data. They would first be anonymized and
aggregated beforehand to assure your privacy to be protected.”).
122. FitBit Privacy Policy, supra note 121.
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the 2015 Super Bowl, Fitbit used fitness information gathered by its 
devices to measure and track its users’ excitement throughout the game by 
examining users’ heart rates.
123
  Fitbit’s Privacy Policy explains, “[w]hen 
we provide this information, we perform appropriate procedures so that the 
data does not identify you and we contractually prohibit recipients of the 
data from re-identifying it back to you.”
124
  Thus, the line between 
identifying and non-identifying data is critical because many companies 
and privacy regulations
125
 use that line as the boundary for determining 
which data may be shared with, or even sold to, third parties.  As that line 
blurs (because it is becoming easier to reidentify anonymized data
126
), 
many of the privacy safeguards currently in place will become ineffective 
and relatively meaningless, leaving consumers vulnerable to potentially 
vast invasions of privacy, ranging from unforeseen uses of data to the re-
identification of supposedly anonymous data. 
Recently, researchers have been calling attention to the ease with 
which de-identified information can be reidentified, exposing users’ 
identities, by cross-referencing that data with other data sets.
127
  As early as 
2000, researcher Latanya Sweeney showed that eighty-seven percent of 
Americans could be identified using only their birth date, zip code, and 
sex.
128
  After Netflix released an anonymized data set of 100 million movie 
ratings collected from nearly half a million users as part of a contest in 
2006, researchers Arvind Narayanan and Vitalu Shmatikov were able to 
“unmask” these anonymous users by cross-referencing the anonymized 
data, which included timestamps, with non-anonymized movie ratings 
123. Robert DS, Heart-Racing Moments from the Big Game, THE FITBIT BLOG (Feb. 3,
2015), http://blog.fitbit.com/heart-racing-moments-from-the-big-game/#i.ml8qpjotef9hur. 
124. Id.
125. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“[N]early every information privacy law 
or regulation grants a get-out-of-jail-free cardto those who anonymize their data.”).  
126. See e.g., Nate Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/your-secrets-live-online-
in-databases-of-ruin/; Kim Zetter, The World’s Most Wired Computer Scientist: Arvind 
Narayanan, WIRED (June 18, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/wmw-arvind-narayanan/; 
Nate Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 31, 
2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/03/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-anonymous-twitter 
ers/.  
127. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716 (arguing that researchers have essentially “blown up”
the robust anonymization assumption, casting doubt on the ability of de-identification to 
adequately protect users’ identities); Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s 
Why Not, supra note 126; Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers, 
supra note 126; Eric Bangeman, AOL Subscribers Sue Over Data Leak, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 
2006), http://arstechnica.com/business/2006/09/7835/; Zetter, supra note 126. 
128. Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, supra note 126.
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posted publicly on the Internet Movie Database.
129
  In 2009, Narayanan and 
Shmatikov used similar methods on Twitter and Flickr to demonstrate once 
again that data can easily be cross-referenced with other data sets in order 
to expose users’ identities.
130
  In that case, they found that one-third of 
users who have accounts on both Twitter and Flickr could be identified on 
Twitter using their Flickr connections.
131
  Like Netflix, AOL also 
inadvertently exposed users to privacy intrusions when they released search 
queries performed by 65,000 of its users.
132
  Even though AOL had 
anonymized the data by “scrubbing” it of personal information, computer 
scientists were still able to use that data to identify individual users.
133
 
These examples of easy re-identification expose the serious flaws of 
permitting companies to share anonymized data.  They demonstrate that, 
with the right reference points, the distinction between identifying and 
anonymized data can be circumvented in order to reveal and exploit 
personal information.  Even though Fitbit states in its Privacy Policy that it 
contractually prevents its partners from reidentifying user data,
134
 it is 
unclear how effectively Fitbit is able to enforce that policy, and many other 
companies do not even include such protections in their policies.  The line 
between anonymized and identifying information is particularly crucial in 
the context of fitness trackers that track information like user locations, 
activity levels, sleep habits, or heart rates.  If personal information can be 
accessed through anonymized search queries, Facebook likes, Twitter IDs, 
and Netflix information, it is easy to imagine cross-referencing the 
anonymized data shared by companies like Jawbone or Basis with other 
data points in order to reidentify individual users.  If computer scientists 
can predict political leanings, sexual orientation, or emotional stability 
based on an individual user’s Facebook likes,
135
 it is highly probable that 
similar inferences can be made from data gathered by fitness trackers, 
which measure users’ lives in granular detail. 
The concerns surrounding reidentified data are further amplified when 
taken together with users’ false sense of security concerning fitness 
trackers and future unanticipated uses of shared information.  Following the 
current trajectory of current data uses, it is not difficult to imagine a 
129. Zetter, supra note 126.
130. Anderson, Pulling Back the Curtain on “Anonymous” Twitterers, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. Bangeman, supra note 127.
133. Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and Here’s Why Not, supra note 126; see
also Bangeman, supra note 127 (reporting that the New York Times was even able to use this data 
to track down searcher no. 4417749, a 62-year-old widow in Georgia). 
134. See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 121.
135. Kamdar & Maass, supra note 113.
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scenario in which “anonymized’ data collected and shared by fitness 
trackers today is reidentified using non-anonymized reference points in the 
future to create a digital footprint used in employment decisions, insurance 
benefits, legal proceedings, and other decisions that significantly impact 
users’ lives. 
IV. Proposal: Statutory Guidelines for Fitness
Trackers Modeled After HIPAA 
Fitness trackers present heightened and unique privacy concerns 
because they collect and transmit the intimate and granular details of users’ 
lives.  In the hands of computer scientists, employers, insurance companies, 
or other entities, this information has the potential to reveal shocking 
amounts of information about users’ health, personality, and behavior.  
While most laws and privacy policies limit a company’s ability to share or 
sell identifying personal information, researchers have explicitly shown 
that anonymized data can be cross-referenced with publically available 
non-anonymized data to identify individual “anonymous” users.
136
  These 
developments have opened the floodgates for unanticipated and insidious 
uses of data collected by fitness trackers to target and make intimate 
inferences about individual users. 
Even though the information gathered by fitness trackers is not 
currently protected by HIPAA (unless that information happens to qualify 
as PHI under HIPAA
137
), it constitutes sensitive information and should be 
protected as such.  Additionally, because users often perceive fitness 
trackers as harmless accessories, rather than devices that transmit and store 
huge amounts of revealing health information, regulation is necessary to 
ensure consumers make effective and informed decisions concerning such 
devices.  In order to adequately protect users’ privacy rights against the 
daunting potential uses of fitness tracker information, Congress should 
adopt a statutory scheme modeled after HIPPAA (or alternatively, an 
extension of HIPAA specifically crafted for fitness trackers and health-
related mobile applications) with six critical components: (1) Flexibility, 
(2) Data Minimization, (3) Notice and Control, (4) Limitations on Future
Uses, (5) Security, and (6) Data Breach Notification.  While none of these
components can effectively guard against privacy invasions alone, together
they create a comprehensive approach that limits the way health
information is gathered and stored by fitness trackers, enables users to
136. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716.
137. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6. 
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make informed choices about how and when they share fitness information, 
and protects that information once it has been shared. 
A. Flexibility: The Key to Staying Ahead of the Technological Curve
While flexibility is not an explicit feature of this proposed statutory
scheme, it is a necessary component of any statutory approach to regulating 




 of fitness trackers is rising, 
and computer scientists are improving in their ability to reidentify 
supposedly anonymized data.
140
  In order to keep up with the rapidly 
changing field of fitness trackers, any approach must be flexible enough to 
adapt to technological and marketplace advances.  This can be achieved by 
establishing broad guidelines similar to those established by HIPAA.  Even 
though HHS is responsible for civil enforcement of HIPAA,
141
 as Solove 
and Winn both recognize, state courts have also used the standards set forth 
by HIPAA to establish the standard of care in tort cases.
142
  A similar 
approach should apply to fitness trackers.  While federal agencies should 
have the power to enforce fitness tracker regulations, the proposed statute 
would also explicitly allow state courts to use such regulations to establish 
the standard of care in common law tort cases.  Such an approach would 
allow the standard set forth by the proposed regulation to evolve in 
response to technological changes. 
B. Data Minimization: Who Can Store What and For How Long?
In order to properly protect fitness tracker information, the proposed
statute must limit the collection and retention of PFI.  Because data 
collected in aggregate can be used for unforeseen future purposes,
143
 
Congress should limit the amount of health information gathered and 
retained by companies that offer fitness trackers to the public.  The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule provides substantial guidance on this subject by requiring 
covered entities to make reasonable efforts to use and disclose only the 
minimum amount of PHI needed for an intended purpose.
144
  Fitness tracker 
regulation should also require companies to collect only the health 
138. See Martin, supra note 11.
139. See Rose, supra note 1; Fitbit, Find Your Fit, supra note 17; Jawbone, Compare
Trackers, supra note 19. 
140. See Ohm, supra note 125, at 716; Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t—and
Here’s Why Not, supra note 126. 
141. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra
note 6; Solove, supra note 39, at 106. 
142. See Solove, supra note 69; Winn, supra note 69.
143. See, e.g., North, supra note 111; Kamdar & Maass, supra note 113.
144. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 6. 
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information required for a particular task or use.  The proposed regulation 
would take this approach a step further by also limiting the retention of data 
that is no longer necessary for the intended purpose.  This would mean that 
companies would be barred from storing or selling information that is no 
longer needed “just in case” it may come in handy later for a future 
unforeseen use.  Even though this standard may be difficult to define and 
apply, establishing such a standard would at the very least put companies 
on notice that their ability to collect data is not unlimited.  While not a 
complete solution, these limitations would significantly diminish the 
danger that information gathered today will be used to make important 
decisions about consumers in the future. 
C. Notice & Control: Giving Consumers the Tools They Need in Order to
Make Informed Decisions About Sensitive Information.
HIPAA also facilitates users’ control over PHI through its Notice,
Authorization, and Right of Access requirements.
145
  The Notice 
requirement establishes that covered entities must make their privacy 
practices known to patients, while the Right of Access and Authorization 
requirements increase the degree of control patients exercise over their 
PHI.
146
  The proposed statute would include similar provisions to ensure 
that consumers are adequately informed as to how their data is being used 
and to safeguard users’ ability to exercise effective control over their health 
information.  To achieve this purpose, the statute would explicitly require 
companies to outline all current uses of data, as well as any anticipated 
future uses.  If companies reserve the right to share or sell de-identified 
data to third parties, they would also be required to disclose the risks of re-
identification to consumers.  Companies would also be required to disclose 
further steps consumers can take to protect their PFI, such as encryption.  
Moreover, any data uses that are not necessary to the primary use of the 
device would require users to explicitly “opt-in” to those uses.  Finally, the 
proposed statute would also explicitly prohibit certain uses of PFI, such as 
using PFI for discriminatory purposes.  While such actions may be difficult 
to prove and may overlap with other areas of law, such as employment law, 
these regulations would at least send a clear message to companies that 
certain uses are improper and would help to establish a company’s duty to 
its users.  These measures would increase the degree of control users 
exercise over their PFI and improve consumers’ ability to make considered 
and informed decisions regarding their fitness information. 
145. Id.
146. Id.
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D. Security:  Protecting Sensitive Information Once It Has Been Shared
Without effective security requirements, any statutory scheme would
be unable to adequately protect against privacy invasions that may occur 
once PFI is shared.  Accordingly, the proposed regulation would also 
include security requirements modeled after the HIPAA Security Rule.  
The legislation would impose security requirements on all information 
gathered by fitness trackers and stored by the companies who sell such 
devices.  Like the HIPAA Security Rule,
147
 the proposed statute would 
require companies to (1) ensure the confidentiality of health information 
collected and stored by fitness trackers (including through encryption); (2) 
identify and protect against threats to security (both on their servers and in 
the devices themselves); (3) take reasonable precautions against 
impermissible uses and disclosures; (4) provide adequate training to its 
employees and business associates; and (5) ensure compliance by its 
employees and business associates.  These measures would aid in the 
protection of health information by significantly decreasing the risk of 
improper disclosures and data breaches. 
E. Data Breach Notification:  Applying the HITECH Act to Fitness
Trackers
The proposed statute would also include data breach and notification
requirements modeled after the HITECH Act.
148
  Like the HITECH Act, 
the proposed statute would require companies to notify customers of 
breaches within 60 days of discovering the breach and notify the media for 
breaches affecting more than 500 customers.  It would also require 
companies to perform an investigation into how the breach occurred and 
remedy any gaps in their security or policies as soon as reasonably 
possible.  Assuming a breach does occur, these measures would aid in the 
protection of PFI by regulating how companies deal with breaches, and by 
diminishing the risk of future invasions of privacy. 
V. Conclusion
Even though the reasonable expectation of privacy has changed 
significantly since Katz, that standard is still alive today in the form of 
privacy policies and statutes like HIPAA and the FTCA, which protect 
against the improper disclosure of users’ personal information.  These 
measures safeguard consumer privacy by limiting the circumstances in 
which users’ information may be shared with or sold to third parties.  The 
147. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HITECH Act Enforcement Interim 
Final Rule, supra note 54.  
148. Id.
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regulation of fitness trackers is an urgent issue that should be addressed by 
Congress because fitness trackers are becoming extremely popular and are 
beginning to be used in new contexts such as employment and insurance 
coverage. 
The fitness tracker statute proposed in this note would fill a statutory 
gap by providing specific regulation of the PFI collected by fitness 
trackers.  The proposed statute would follow the guidelines for protecting 
PHI established by HIPAA and adapt them for the purposes of protecting 
PFI gathered by fitness trackers.  Like HIPAA, the statute would be 
designed to strike a balance between protecting users’ fitness information 
and allowing companies to continue to provide their beneficial fitness 
tracking services to the public.  While the proposed statute will admittedly 
place some burden on the companies that manufacture and sell fitness 
trackers, that burden is necessary in order to adequately protect consumers.  
PFI must be regulated because it has the potential to reveal intimate 
personal information about users, which, when collected in the aggregate, 
can be used to make discriminatory or otherwise unfair decisions about 
consumers without their knowledge.  Moreover, regulation is also 
necessary because users tend to underestimate the privacy concerns 
associated with fitness trackers.  The proposed statute would protect 
consumers by increasing transparency between customers and companies, 
provide clear guidelines for companies, increase the security of PFI, and 
limit the improper use of fitness information. 
